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Abstract 19 
Kleptoparasitism (food stealing) is a significant behaviour for animals that forage in social 20 
groups as it permits some individuals to obtain resources whilst avoiding the costs of 21 
searching for their own food. Evolutionary game theory has been used to model 22 
kleptoparasitism, with a series of differential equation based compartmental models 23 
providing significant theoretical insights into behaviour in kleptoparasitic populations. In this 24 
paper we apply this compartmental modelling approach to kleptoparasitic behaviour in a real 25 
foraging population of urban gulls (Laridae). Field data was collected on kleptoparasitism 26 
and a model developed that incorporated the same kleptoparasitic and defensive strategies 27 
available to the study population. Two analyses were conducted: 1. An assessment of whether 28 
the density of each behaviour in the population was at an equilibrium. 2. An investigation of 29 
whether individual foragers were using Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) in the correct 30 
environmental conditions. The results showed the density of different behaviours in the 31 
population could be at an equilibrium at plausible values for handling time and fight duration. 32 
Individual foragers used aggressive kleptoparasitic strategies effectively in the correct 33 
environmental conditions but some individuals in those same conditions failed to defend food 34 
items. This was attributed to the population being composed of three species that differed in 35 
competitive ability. These competitive differences influenced the strategies that individuals 36 
were able to use. Rather than gulls making poor behavioural decisions these results suggest a 37 
more complex three-species model is required to describe the behaviour of this population.  38 
3 
 
Key words: evolutionary game theory, ESS, urban gulls, Laridae, kleptoparasitism, social 39 
foraging.   40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Introduction 41 
Kleptoparasitism is defined as the theft of already procured food by one individual from 42 
another (Brockmann & Barnard, 1979). It is one of the most widespread forms of exploitation 43 
found in nature  having been observed across several taxonomic groups, including spiders 44 
(Coyle et al. 1991), insects (Erlandsson, 1988), mammals (Janson, 1985; Carbone et al. 2005) 45 
and birds (Barnard, 1990; Brockmann & Barnard, 1979).  The significance of kleptoparasitic 46 
behaviour is that it allows individuals to avoid some of the costs of the foraging cycle 47 
(searching for, acquiring and handling food items) by exploiting food discovered by another 48 
individual’s effort (Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000).  49 
As a behaviour with a potentially significant impact on fitness, kleptoparasitism has 50 
attracted the interest of researchers and, due to the prevalence of kleptoparasitic species 51 
within the class Aves, research effort has focused on birds more than other taxa. Amongst the 52 
birds, some species specialise in an almost entirely parasitic lifestyle, such as the skuas 53 
(Sterciraridae) and frigatebirds (Fregatidae). In other species kleptoparasitism is just one of 54 
a number of foraging strategies used. Brockmann & Barnard (1979) conducted a review of 55 
kleptoparasitic incidents reported in the ornithological literature over a forty-year period. 56 
From this they identified the taxonomic families containing the largest number of 57 
kleptoparasitic species. The families of birds with the highest numbers of kleptoparasites 58 
were the Falconidae (falcons, kestrels, caracaras), Accipitridae (hawks, eagles, harriers, old 59 
world vultures), and the Laridae (gulls). The presence of kleptoparasitism in the Laridae 60 
being much more pronounced than in the other families with 23 of the 88 species of gull 61 
making use of kleptoparasitic strategies. The significant investment of gulls in 62 
kleptoparasitism highlights the value of this strategy to those species making them an 63 
important family of birds for research into kleptoparasitism (Verbeek, 1977a; Verbeek, 64 
1977b; Barnard & Thompson, 1985; Spencer et al. 2017).  65 
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Kleptoparasitic interactions occur when individuals forage socially (Barnard, 1984), 66 
and gulls are highly gregarious (Perrins, 2009). Much of the sociality of gulls outside the 67 
breeding season consists of mixed-species feeding aggregations around ephemeral food 68 
sources (Tinbergen, 1953; Perrins, 2009). These aggregations are complex competitive 69 
situations of the type likely to encourage kleptoparasitism as a foraging strategy. In gulls, 70 
kleptoparasitism has also been shown to be a facultative response to changing environmental 71 
conditions (Maniscalco & Ostrand, 1997). High levels of kleptoparasitism are more likely 72 
when certain environmental conditions prevail (Brockmann & Barnard, 1979), these include 73 
high densities of foragers and high concentrations of larger food items (Spencer et al. 2017).  74 
Further, kleptoparasitism is not a unitary concept (Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000) and 75 
theft can be enacted through one of three kleptoparasitic strategies that have been described. 76 
These are aggressive kleptoparasitism (use of force or threat to steal food – Hansen, 1986; 77 
Liker & Barta, 2002), stealth kleptoparasitism (sneaky theft with limited interaction between 78 
kleptoparasite and host – Hockey et al. 1989) and scramble kleptoparasitism (theft by 79 
multiple individuals – Erlandsson, 1988). The quantity and divisibility of food items, as well 80 
as competitive differences between foragers will clearly influence which of these strategies 81 
are used when a kleptoparasitic population exploits a finite patch of resources. The fact that 82 
gulls frequently forage in mixed-species flocks, differ in size and competitive ability between 83 
species and are opportunistic foragers with a diverse diet suggests that all three of these 84 
strategies may be utilised if the correct social and environmental circumstances are 85 
encountered.  86 
Following Giraldeau & Caraco (2000) we define a behaviour to be social foraging if 87 
two or more individuals associate and the functional consequences of their foraging 88 
behaviours are interdependent. Kleptoparasitism can be considered a social foraging strategy, 89 
a consequence of this is that the best foraging decision an individual can make depends on 90 
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what other individuals in the population are doing. Giraldeau & Caraco (2000) defined this as 91 
the “concurrent economic interdependence among different individuals’ payoffs and 92 
penalties” (p.3). A critical implication of this is that the analysis of kleptoparasitic behaviours 93 
requires the use of game theory. Indeed, contests over resources of this nature were among 94 
the foundational questions initially addressed by evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 95 
1982). Several approaches have been taken to modelling kleptoparasitism using game theory, 96 
these include Producer-Scrounger (P-S) Models (Barnard & Sibly, 1981) and 97 
Kleptoparasitism Models (Broom & Ruxton, 1998).  98 
P-S models identify the equilibrium or stable level of kleptoparasitism that should 99 
occur in a given population. A key feature of such models is that food items, or the items of 100 
food within a patch, are highly divisible. This can be a realistic assumption when studying 101 
certain species, for example, the patches exploited by many seed feeding passerines often 102 
contain many small items that can be shared between numerous foragers (Barnard & Sibly, 103 
1981). However, frequently food patches will contain fewer items that have only limited 104 
divisibility. This was true of the foraging environment exploited by the gull population that 105 
was the focus of this research.  106 
The Kleptoparasitism Models developed by Broom and colleagues (Broom & Ruxton, 107 
1998; Broom et al., 2004) model foraging situations where food items come in single units 108 
that have limited divisibility and are often completely consumed by an individual forager. 109 
These Kleptoparasitism Models can be used to analyse the frequency of producing to 110 
scrounging behaviour, much like P-S models, but have an advantage over P-S models in that 111 
they can also be used to investigate the conditions that promote the theft of food and to assess 112 
the best decision individual foragers can make given those conditions. In this research we 113 
considered all three of these analyses when investigating the kleptoparasitic behaviours of a 114 
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foraging gull population, so we adopted Kleptoparasitism Models as the most appropriate 115 
modelling technique.  116 
Kleptoparasitism Models (Broom & Ruxton, 1998; Broom & Ruxton, 2003; Broom et 117 
al. 2004; Broom & Rychtar, 2007; Broom & Rychtar, 2009; Hadjichrysanthou & Broom, 118 
2012) have systematically explored the kleptoparasitic foraging space, often changing key 119 
variables of the model one at a time to examine how this influenced behaviour. For example, 120 
the initial model in this series by Broom & Ruxton (1998), based on a mechanistic model by 121 
Ruxton & Moody (1997), considered a population of foragers where a searcher, upon 122 
encountering another forager handling a food item, was faced with the decision whether to 123 
ignore that handler and keep searching for food items or attempt to steal food from the 124 
handler. The handler was assumed always to defend its food item from attempts to steal it. In 125 
a later model (Broom et al. 2004) the assumption that the handler always defends was relaxed 126 
and the handler was given the option of whether to defend the food item or surrender it 127 
without a fight. The key features of the models developed by Broom and colleagues are: a 128 
foraging population of a fixed density; a compartmental approach to modelling the population 129 
where individuals can be in only one behavioural state at a time (e.g.. handling, searching or 130 
fighting) and the rates of change between those behavioural states are described by a system 131 
of differential equations; the assumption, previously mentioned, that food items come in 132 
single units that have limited divisibility and are consumed completely by an individual 133 
forager; as well as the use of time to model all foraging costs. Here, searching for food items, 134 
handling a food item, and engaging in a fight to either try to steal or keep hold of a food item 135 
all have a cost in terms of time. The costs incurred by the forager for making the incorrect 136 
behavioural decision accumulate over time because, whilst it is engaged in the wrong 137 
behaviour, it loses the opportunity to be doing something else that could more quickly lead to 138 
the acquisition of a food item and is thereby more profitable.  139 
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The kleptoparasitism modelling approach can be extended in many ways to consider 140 
various constraints and assumptions in relation to the environment and foragers. For example, 141 
the complexity of the basic model can be increased by introducing competitive differences 142 
between foragers in the population and by increasing the number of behavioural strategies 143 
they can use. These models, whilst more complex to find solutions for,  still assume a forager 144 
seeks to maximise its rate of food or energy intake whilst foraging and this is achieved by 145 
choosing the behaviours that minimise the amount of time needed to obtain and consume 146 
food items.  147 
The complexity of organisms, particularly when studied in wild populations means we 148 
must often rely on simple measurements that act as proxies for fitness (Hunt & Hodgson, 149 
2010). An animal’s food intake rate can be seen as a proxy for fitness mediated through 150 
survivorship. Survivorship is a key component of fitness (Hunt & Hodgson, 2010), so an 151 
animal that maximises its long-term rate of food intake will, on average, have higher 152 
survivorship relative to other foragers in the population with whom it is competing. This 153 
higher feeding rate is assumed to translate into a fitness advantage for that individual and the 154 
genes that encode for the successful strategy it uses (Grafen, 1991).     155 
Kleptoparasitism Models developed by Broom and colleagues have provided many 156 
theoretical insights into the behaviours we should expect to be prevalent in a population, 157 
however, little empirical work has been conducted to test these models or to compare their 158 
predictions against the behaviour of real foragers. This is because it is difficult to find real 159 
foraging populations that match all the simplifying assumptions necessary for comparison 160 
against a mathematical model. 161 
In this research the compartmental kleptoparasitism modelling approach was used to 162 
investigate the behaviours of a real population of gulls foraging in an urban environment. 163 
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This was a population at Billingsgate Market, London, UK. The population at Billingsgate 164 
consists of three gull species all competing to exploit food resources in the car park area of 165 
the market.  166 
A number of features of the foraging environment and the gull population at 167 
Billingsgate made it a useful candidate for using mathematical modelling as a study tool. 168 
First, the site is an anthropogenic environment and not a complex natural food web. This 169 
allowed us to consider Billingsgate as a kind of natural laboratory. The foraging area at 170 
Billingsgate is discrete and of a fixed size (the car park area), so travel time costs between 171 
patches in the foraging area could be largely discounted. In addition, the population at 172 
Billingsgate consists of three gull species all competing to exploit the same anthropogenic 173 
food discards, there are no other trophic levels involved, no other competitor species from 174 
outside the Laridae family and no predator species that might affect foraging behaviour that 175 
needed to be considered. The gulls show high levels of habituations to humans and their 176 
vehicles at this site; we noted this during field observations through the birds’ short flight 177 
initiation distances. The presence of humans clearly influences foraging behaviour but this is 178 
largely through these birds having associated humans and their vehicles with the presence of 179 
food at the site. Humans were viewed primarily as an opportunity for food as opposed to a 180 
perceived predatory risk. All of the above factors made it easier to meet some of the 181 
simplifying assumptions necessary when trying to model behaviour mathematically.  182 
Second, as all three study species were gull species they effectively have the same 183 
behavioural abilities and design with which to manipulate their environment when foraging, 184 
despite differing in competitive ability due to size differences. Having a standardised model 185 
forager again simplified the mathematics needed to model the foraging situation.  186 
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Third, the population at Billingsgate is stable. Birds are able to arrive and leave but on 187 
the whole the size and composition of the population exploiting food resources at the site 188 
remained fairly constant. Headcounts for the population, over the year of study, showed that 189 
the mean population size varied very little from month to month, having a small standard 190 
deviation relative to the mean. The population consisted of only the three study species and 191 
comparisons of headcounts for the total population and headcounts for patches showed a 192 
great deal of correspondence between the proportion of each species engaged in foraging and 193 
the proportion of each species in the population as a whole. This stability made the 194 
boundaries of the Billingsgate study population more clearly demarcated than is often 195 
possible for a wild population of birds. This fits with the assumption of a foraging population 196 
of fixed density used in this modelling approach.  197 
Fourth, the real foraging data recorded at Billingsgate was obtained using 198 
observational field methods. This meant that it was not possible to directly measure the 199 
energetic costs of fighting over a food item or any possible injury costs to the individuals 200 
involved. However, the observational methods used did permit the costs of fights and 201 
searching for food items to be measured in terms of the duration of time they took, this 202 
matched the method for assessing costs used in the various models developed by Broom and 203 
colleagues. 204 
Fieldwork was conducted at Billingsgate Market to record the kleptoparasitic 205 
interactions occurring between the gulls in that environment. The compartmental modelling 206 
approach was then used to develop a model of that population using the population 207 
parameters and strategies available to the foraging gulls at Billingsgate. The model was 208 
compared to the foraging behaviour recorded at Billingsgate to assess whether different 209 
behaviours were at equilibrium densities in the population and to conduct an analysis of 210 
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whether individuals in the Billingsgate population are making the best behavioural responses 211 
in their use of kleptoparasitism. 212 
As natural selection is expected to produce foragers that are efficient and make 213 
effective behavioural decisions, it was predicted that the density of distinct foraging 214 
behaviours at Billingsgate would be at or close to equilibrium densities predicted by the 215 
model. As food at this site is limited in divisibility and quantity and the population is stable, 216 
we can expect there to be a minimum level of competition below which the population rarely 217 
falls, even if the composition of individual patches varies. Although we were unable to mark 218 
individual birds, the few colour ringed birds and birds with plumage aberrations or old 219 
injuries that were distinctive were sighted repeatedly suggesting that some of the birds 220 
foraging at Billingsgate were there consistently. In addition, the food that is available at the 221 
site is regularly scheduled, it occurs between certain hours of the day in predictable locations 222 
and in some cases is provided by the same individuals, parked in the same place, disposing of 223 
their discards at about the same time, making the competitions individuals engage in 224 
iterations of very similar contests over resources. Based on these factors we expected gulls at 225 
Billingsgate to be effective at making economic decisions regarding when to attempt 226 
kleptoparasitism and when to not. Foragers at Billingsgate were thereby expected to have 227 
converged over time to equilibrium densities of the different foraging behaviours present in 228 
the population.  229 
Further, it was predicted that individual gulls in the foraging population would also be 230 
effective at deciding which behavioural strategy was the best in different environmental 231 
conditions and at adjusting their behaviour accordingly as environmental parameters in 232 
individual patches, such as food availability and population density, changed (Sirot, 2000). 233 
This was expected as kleptoparasitic strategies in wild gull populations have in previous 234 
research been shown to be facultative responses to changing environmental conditions 235 
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(Maniscalco & Ostrand, 1997) and as kleptoparasitism is ubiquitous among these species, 236 
that are highly mobile and encounter varied environmental conditions, it is assumed to be a 237 
beneficial foraging strategy with significant adaptive value.  238 
 239 
Methods 240 
Study Site and Species 241 
Study Site: Billingsgate Market, London (Lat: 51°30'20.40"N; Long: 0°00'43.90"W) is a 242 
seafood market in the Canary Wharf area of East London. Research at this location was 243 
conducted in a car park area used by fishmongers to process and load their stock onto vans, 244 
called the Trader’s Car Park. The Trader’s Car Park covered an area of 0.0104 square 245 
kilometres (10,400𝑚2). The size of this area was calculated using scaled aerial photographs 246 
from google maps. Figure 1 shows the boundaries of the Trader’s Car Park from an aerial 247 
position.   248 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 249 
Study Species: Gulls aggregate at Billingsgate to exploit seafood waste and leftovers 250 
discarded in the car park areas. The population of gulls found at this site consists of the Great 251 
Black-backed gull (GBB: Larus marinus), Herring gull (HG: Larus argentatus) and Black-252 
headed gull (BHG: Chroicocephalus ridibundus). The exact history of the presence of a 253 
foraging gull population at Billingsgate is unknown; however, the site has been operating as a 254 
fish market in its current location since 1982. It is likely that gulls have been exploiting 255 
resources at this site for much of this time. The only other species’ that occasionally exploit 256 
food opportunities at this site are small numbers of visitors from the Corvidae and 257 
Columbidae bird families. However, these species are infrequent visitors that largely avoid 258 
foraging groups of gulls.  259 
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Measures 260 
Population size and composition: The size and composition of the population at Billingsgate 261 
was calculated using two methods. The first used headcount photos to count the total size and 262 
composition of the population present at the site. The size of the gull population at 263 
Billingsgate was calculated using headcounts from scan samples at 30 minute intervals. The 264 
number and species of gulls at the site were recorded. The second used headcounts at 265 
foraging patches to calculate the number and species of gulls engaged in foraging behaviour. 266 
Videos of foraging patches were viewed and a record made of the number and species of all 267 
individuals that attended the patch to forage.  268 
Kleptoparasitism: Kleptoparasitism was recorded as frequency counts. Kleptoparasitic 269 
behaviours were deemed to have taken place if the strategies of aggressive or stealth 270 
kleptoparasitism, described by Giraldeau & Caraco (2000), were used. These were 271 
operationalised as follows: 272 
Aggressive kleptoparasitism: Aggressive kleptoparasitism occurred if the parasite used force 273 
or threats to attempt kleptoparasitism through any of the behaviours described in Table 1. The 274 
use of threats constituted attempted kleptoparasitism without the incident necessarily 275 
escalating to physical contact between the parasite and the host as the host could choose to 276 
surrender the food item rather than defend it. Successful use of aggressive kleptoparasitism 277 
occurred only if the parasite obtained the whole of the food item being contested, either by 278 
physically taking it or if the host surrendered the item following one of the threats described 279 
(Table 1).  280 
Stealth kleptoparasitism: Stealth kleptoparasitism was typified by the use of speed to 281 
approach, grab the food item and try to make off without directly confronting the handler for 282 
the item.  Behaviours constituting stealth kleptoparasitism are described in Table 1. If the 283 
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parasite managed to obtain any proportion of the food item being contested successful use of 284 
stealth kleptoparasitism had occurred.  285 
Host responses to kleptoparasitism: Analysis was conducted to evaluate the response of hosts 286 
when attacked by kleptoparasites. Hosts could either try to defend the food item they were 287 
handling or surrender the item to the kleptoparasite. Of the 577 kleptoparasitic attempts 288 
recorded, a strategy (surrender or defend) could be attributed to the host on 321 occasions. A 289 
conservative criterion was used to avoid misattributing defensive strategies. On the 256 290 
occasions where it was not possible to attribute a strategy this was often because the 291 
observer’s view of the handler became obstructed at the crucial moment. This was common 292 
due to the frantic nature of the foraging activity in patches. 293 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 294 
Procedure 295 
Observations at Billingsgate were conducted between the hours of 7am and 3pm. The trading 296 
hours for the market are 3am to 8:30am. After 8:30am the main activity at the site is the 297 
clean-up of the market and car park areas. Prior to 7am it was not possible to conduct 298 
observations as the large number of vehicles at the site made unobstructed observations of the 299 
study area unfeasible. After 7am the car park emptied considerably making it easier to 300 
conduct observations. This was the time that the largest number of gulls foraged in the car 301 
park. Field sessions had a mean duration of 2 hours 52 minutes (Range: 2h – 5h 05m) and 302 
were conducted on days when the market was operational (Tuesday – Saturday) and when it 303 
was closed (Sunday, Monday). A total of 80 hours 15 minutes of field observations were 304 
conducted over 33 field days across the course of a calendar year between July 2014 and June 305 
2015.  306 
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Observations were conducted from a vehicle. On each study day the location that 307 
would give the best unobstructed view of the study area was identified and used as the 308 
observation position for that field session. It was not always possible to use the same position 309 
as the unpredictable nature of vehicular traffic at the site meant a good observation point one 310 
day may have a view obstructed by a large vehicle the next. Food resources at the site were 311 
located in discrete patches where they were either spilled or discarded on the ground. When 312 
patches of food were discovered by gulls they were filmed from inside the vehicle using a 313 
Sony 8.9 megapixel HD camcorder. Using the vehicle as a hide in this way meant that the 314 
presence of the researcher did not disturb foraging behaviour in the study area. Patches were 315 
filmed until the resource in the patch had depleted and the birds dispersed. Over the year of 316 
study 183 foraging patches were recorded and the time taken to deplete these patches ranged 317 
in duration from 0 minutes 25 seconds to 29 minutes 36 seconds. The location of patches 318 
within the study area, the start and end time of the patch and the headcount and species of the 319 
gulls present at the patch were recorded. Patch videos were analysed at a later time for 320 
kleptoparasitic incidents, where the species, strategy and outcome of the interaction were 321 
noted. Patch videos were also analysed to assess the rate of food intake through foraging at 322 
the site. This involved counting all occasions when foragers in a patch sampled the ground 323 
for a food item, and all occasions when they actually obtained a food item. The species and 324 
number of individuals exploiting a foraging patch was also recorded.   325 
To identify the strategies used by foragers at Billingsgate, focal animal observations 326 
were conducted using video recordings of foraging patches. Individual foragers were 327 
observed as they moved around the patch and a continuous record was made of their foraging 328 
behaviours, indicating whether they sampled for food items, attacked using AGG, attacked 329 
using ST and, when handling, whether they defended, resisted or surrendered against attacks 330 
by other foragers. These focal animal observations were used to build up a picture of the 331 
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forager’s behaviour and to attribute a strategy to the forager based on the ESS strategies 332 
outlined in Table 4.  333 
Headcounts of the total population were conducted at 30 minute intervals from the 334 
start of a field session. A series of photographs was taken using a Nikon Coolpix P510 (42x 335 
zoom) bridge camera, to capture all gulls in the study area. These photographs were later 336 
analysed to calculate the population size and composition. 337 
 338 
The model 339 
The foraging behaviours considered in this model are: searching for food items, handling 340 
food items, and two kleptoparasitic strategies, aggressive kleptoparasitism and stealth 341 
kleptoparasitism. A forager encountering a handler can choose to ignore the handler and keep 342 
searching or attack the handler using either aggressive or stealth kleptoparasitism. Similarly, 343 
a handler attacked by another forager can choose to defend or surrender its food item. These 344 
interactions effectively encapsulated the behaviours of interest present in the Billingsgate 345 
population. Although there is potentially a third type of kleptoparasitic strategy described by 346 
Giraldeau & Caraco (2000) that gulls can use, ‘scramble kleptoparasitism’, where multiple 347 
foragers simultaneously steal portions of a food item, it was not included in the model due to 348 
its lack of occurrence at Billingsgate.  349 
The model developed here considers a population containing one species of forager. 350 
This single-species model reduced the complexity of the mathematics needed to model the 351 
foraging population and the model was compared against the averaged foraging data obtained 352 
for the whole population at Billingsgate. Although the Billingsgate population contained 3 353 
species, with kleptoparasitism occurring both within and between species, the assumption 354 
was made that averaging the data over the whole year of study would smooth out any 355 
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asymmetries in competitive ability between individuals and species and permit the population 356 
to be viewed as a large population containing just one-species.   357 
Broom et al. (2004) considered a population of foragers that can either attack or 358 
ignore handlers and defend or surrender food items. The model developed here extends this 359 
by considering two types of kleptoparasitic strategy and we retain and extend the notation and 360 
parameters used in Broom et al. (2004) where necessary. The foraging population consists of 361 
a population density of 𝑃 individuals. That foraging population (𝑃) consists of groups of 362 
individuals in different behavioural states or compartments. A forager can only be engaged in 363 
one behavioural state and thereby can only be in one compartment at a time. At any time a 364 
proportion of the foraging population are searching (𝑆) for food items and a proportion are 365 
handling (𝐻) a food item. An average density 𝑓 of food items is available and a forager can 366 
search the foraging area at a rate 𝑣𝑓 for food items. The rate at which food items are 367 
discovered is therefore 𝑣𝑓𝑓. Similarly, the rate at which a forager can search the foraging area 368 
for handlers is 𝑣ℎ, so the rate at which searchers encounter handlers of food items is 𝑣ℎ𝐻. 369 
Following Broom et al. (2004), the time that food items take to handle is modelled using an 370 
exponential probability distribution with mean 𝑡ℎ. Additionally, a proportion of the foraging 371 
population are engaged in fights over food items, either as kleptoparasites trying to steal an 372 
item or handlers trying to keep hold of that food item. As stated previously, two 373 
kleptoparasitic strategies are possible within this population: aggressive kleptoparasitism or 374 
stealth kleptoparasitism. At any given time a proportion of the foraging population (𝑃) will 375 
be attempting to steal items using aggressive kleptoparasitism (𝐴) and a proportion of 376 
handlers will be fighting against those kleptoparasites by trying to defend (𝐷) their food item 377 
from being stolen. Likewise, a proportion of the foraging population will be attempting to 378 
steal using stealth kleptoparasitism (𝐶) and an equal proportion of handlers will be fighting 379 
to resist (𝑅) their food item being stolen by stealth kleptoparasites. Defending and resisting 380 
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are terms that both describe the defensive behaviour of handlers that are under attack, 381 
separate terms were used, for defending against aggressive kleptoparasitism and resisting 382 
against stealth kleptoparasitism, to differentiate the two behaviours as the probability of 383 
defensive behaviour against one type of kleptoparasitism might differ from that of the other 384 
type. Defenders (𝐷) and Resistors (𝑅) are therefore separate behavioural states in the 385 
foraging population (𝑃). The composition of the total foraging population by compartments 386 
that capture the different behavioural states is described by equation (1),  387 
 388 
𝑃 = 𝑆 + 𝐻 + 𝐴 + 𝐷 + 𝐶 + 𝑅.                                                                                                                           (1) 
 389 
 Once a searcher encounters a handler it either attacks the handler using aggressive 390 
kleptoparasitism, it does this with probability 𝑝1, or it attacks the handler using stealth 391 
kleptoparasitism, this occurs with probability 𝑝2, otherwise it ignores the handler and 392 
continues searching for undiscovered food items, this occurs with probability 1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 393 
(note that this means 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 ≤ 1, e.g. see Table 4). Conversely, a handler that is found and 394 
attacked with aggressive kleptoparasitism can either defend against the attack, which it does 395 
with probability 𝑝3, or surrender the food item without a fight, which occurs with probability 396 
1 − 𝑝3. Likewise, a handler that is attacked by a searcher using stealth kleptoparasitism 397 
resists the attack with probability 𝑝4 or surrenders the food item without a fight with 398 
probability 1 − 𝑝4. If a searcher attacks using aggressive or stealth kleptoparasitism and the 399 
handler defends or resists then a fight occurs. The fight lasts for a time duration that is 400 
modelled using an exponential probability distribution. In the case of aggressive 401 
kleptoparasitism the duration of the fight is drawn from an exponential distribution with 402 
mean 𝑡𝑎 2⁄ , the attacker wins the fight with probability 𝛼 and the defender wins the fight with 403 
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probability 1 − 𝛼. The duration of a stealth kleptoparasitism fight is also drawn from an 404 
exponential distribution with mean 𝑡𝑐 2⁄ . The stealth attacker wins the fight with probability 405 
𝛽 and the resistor wins the fight with probability 1 − 𝛽. The mean duration of stealth and 406 
aggressive fights differs as a stealth fight involves less of an interaction between attacker and 407 
handler than an aggressive fight so on average 𝑡𝑐 < 𝑡𝑎. At the end of a fight of either type the 408 
winner begins handling the contested food item and the loser resumes searching, either for 409 
food items or other handlers. The notation used for the strategies and parameters described 410 
above is summarised in Table 2.  411 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 412 
If the foraging population described above and encapsulated in equation (1) is assumed to 413 
consist of only one species then the dynamics of that population are captured by the 414 
compartmental model outlined in Figure 2.  415 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 416 
The change in the density of each behavioural compartment as described by the rates 417 
of inflow and outflow along the arrows shown in Figure 2, within the closed system defined 418 
by equation (1), is described by the following system of 6 differential equations (2-7):  419 
 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
=
1
𝑡ℎ
𝐻 +
2
𝑡𝑐
(1 − 𝛽)𝐶 +
2
𝑡𝑐
𝛽𝑅 +
2
𝑡𝑎
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴 +
2
𝑡𝑎
𝛼𝐷 − 𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑆 − 𝑝1𝑝3𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 − 𝑝2𝑝4𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻,                          (2) 
 
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑆 +
2
𝑡𝑐
𝛽𝐶 +
2
𝑡𝑐
(1 − 𝛽)𝑅 +
2
𝑡𝑎
𝛼𝐴 +
2
𝑡𝑎
(1 − 𝛼)𝐷 −
1
𝑡ℎ
𝐻 − 𝑝1𝑝3𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 − 𝑝2𝑝4𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻,                        (3) 
 
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝2𝑝4𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 −
2
𝑡𝑐
𝐶,                                                                                                                                                       (4) 
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𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝2𝑝4𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 −
2
𝑡𝑐
𝑅,                                                                                                                                                         (5) 
 
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝1𝑝3𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 −
2
𝑡𝑎
𝐴,                                                                                                                                                         (6) 
 
𝑑𝐷
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝1𝑝3𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 −
2
𝑡𝑎
𝐷.                                                                                                                                                        (7) 
 
Analysis 420 
The model was analysed and solved through three stages where equilibrium densities of the 421 
different behaviours and candidate ESS’s were identified. 422 
Stage 1: Equilibrium densities of the behavioural compartments: 423 
The foraging population under consideration is assumed to converge over time towards the 424 
equilibrium state (Luther & Broom (2004) provide a proof of why such an assumption is 425 
justified); this is the point at which the number of individuals in the different behavioural 426 
compartments is not changing and is found by setting each of equations 2 to 7 equal to zero 427 
and solving. So, the behavioural compartments in the population are at equilibrium densities 428 
when: 429 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐷
𝑑𝑡
= 0.                                                                                                                         (8) 
Equations 4, 5, 6 and 7 were solved first. The solutions for these equations were then 430 
substituted for 𝐶,𝑅, 𝐴 and 𝐷 in equation 2 to give the equilibrium density of searchers (𝑆) 431 
shown in equation 9. Equation 9 was then substituted for 𝑆 into the solutions for 𝐶,𝑅, 𝐴 and 432 
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𝐷 to give equilibrium solutions for these four behavioural compartments specified in terms of 433 
only one unknown variable 𝐻, the density of handlers (Note that 𝑆 is already explicit in terms 434 
of 𝐻). These solutions are given in equations 10, 11, 12 and 13.  435 
𝑆 =
𝐻
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                                                                                                                                                                           (9) 
𝐶 =
1
2
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                                                                                                                                                           (10) 
𝑅 =
1
2
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                                                                                                                                                          (11) 
𝐴 =
1
2
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                                                                                                                                                         (12) 
𝐷 =
1
2
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
.                                                                                                                                                    (13) 
 To find the equilibrium density of handlers, the five equilibrium solution (9-13) were 436 
substituted into equation 1 giving equation 14, which simplifies to equation 15.  437 
𝑃 =
𝐻
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+ 𝐻 +
1
2
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+
1
2
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+
1
2
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+
1
2
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                        (14) 
⇒ 𝑃 =
𝐻
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+ 𝐻 +
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
.                                                                                          (15) 
 Equation 15 was solved for 𝐻 to give quadratic equation 16, and the equilibrium 438 
density of handlers is the positive solution to equation 16 depicted using the quadratic 439 
formula in equation 17. Appendix A gives detailed solutions for the system.   440 
−(𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐)𝑣ℎ𝐻
2 − (1 + 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓)𝐻 + 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑃 = 0,                                                                           (16) 
⇒
1 + 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓 ± √(1 + 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓)2 − 4 × −(𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐)𝑣ℎ × 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑃
2 × −(𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐)𝑣ℎ
= 𝐻.                                          (17) 
Stage 2: Conditions for using kleptoparasitism and defending/resisting against 441 
kleptoparasitic attacks:  442 
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This section outlines the conditions when it is advantageous for an individual forager to 443 
attempt kleptoparasitism upon encountering a handler or to defend/resist against 444 
kleptoparasitism when that forager is a handler that has just been challenged. The two types 445 
of kleptoparasitism, aggressive and stealth are abbreviated to AGG and ST for convenience 446 
hereafter.  447 
Some additional assumptions of the model are introduced here. The payoffs obtained 448 
from a fight are measured in terms of units of a food item. The assumption is made that if a 449 
forager attacks using AGG and wins the fight it obtains the whole of the food item contested, 450 
so the gain obtained is the probability of winning times the value of the item, which is 1 451 
(representing one whole food item). Likewise if the handler defends the item and wins an 452 
AGG fight it retains the whole item. It also follows that if a searcher attacks AGG and the 453 
handler surrenders, the attacker obtains the whole food item without a fight. So the gain for 454 
winning an AGG fight is 1 × 𝛼 = 𝛼 (where 𝛼 is the probability of the attacker winning the 455 
fight as defined in Table 2).   456 
In contrast, if a forager attacks using ST and wins the assumption is made that it 457 
obtains only a portion of the food item contested if the handler defends, and the handler 458 
retains the remaining portion. This assumption exists because this strategy is a sneaky 459 
strategy that involved less of an interaction between forager and handler but often resulted in 460 
the attacker obtaining only a portion (𝑥) of the food item (Table 2). So the gain for the 461 
attacker from winning a stealth fight is 𝑥 × 𝛽 =  𝛽𝑥, where 𝑥 is some portion less than 1, and 462 
the proportion retained by the resisting handler even if it loses is: 𝛽(1 − 𝑥). If the forager 463 
attacks ST and loses then the handler retains the whole of the food item, and similarly if the 464 
forager attacks ST and the handler surrenders then the forager obtains the whole food item.  465 
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The value of food items was measured in the way described because the field data for 466 
foraging behaviour at Billingsgate was collected using observational methods, so there was 467 
no way to directly measure the calorific value of different food items. The sizes of items in 468 
the environment also could not be controlled by the researcher. This limitation of the 469 
observational field methods meant that differences in the size and value of food items could 470 
not be accurately quantified but the method described above reduced the need to know these 471 
dimensions by assessing contested items as one unit of food that was either wholly or partly 472 
obtained. The food items at Billingsgate, being anthropogenic waste and seafood discards, are 473 
significantly larger than the food items found at coastal foraging sites (Spencer et al. 2017). 474 
This abundance of larger items meant the majority of food items at Billingsgate were big 475 
enough to make them candidates for kleptoparasitic attempts so none of the resources at 476 
Billingsgate were excluded from the model as being too small for kleptoparasitism.  477 
In effect food items could be repeatedly stolen on multiple occasions; this requires 478 
some clarification of how potentially smaller and smaller items of food that have experienced 479 
some handling were treated, particularly in relation to ST kleptoparasitism where only 480 
portions of the food item are obtained. The assumption made in the model is that an item of 481 
food has the value of one whole food item regardless of whether it has previously been stolen 482 
or been part of a larger item of food. If a forager sees fit to challenge for the item then it is 483 
treated as one unit of food. It will be noted that this is akin to assuming that food items cannot 484 
be stolen multiple times and are only subject to one kleptoparasitic attempt, after which they 485 
are immediately consumed by the kleptoparasite or handler. The validity of this assumption 486 
was investigated by comparing the simplest cases possible in the population involving partial 487 
food items: whether a handler should resist against ST when attacked by a mutant 488 
kleptoparasite in a population that does not use kleptoparasitism. It was found that the 489 
conditions when it was optimal to resist were the same regardless of whether the 490 
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kleptoparasitic incident was the first attempt or a subsequent attempt to steal the food. This 491 
indicated that it was valid to treat each food item as one unit of food regardless of previous 492 
handling or whether it had been subject to previous kleptoparasitic attempts (Appendix B).  493 
A further assumption of the model, mentioned previously, is that the duration of an 494 
AGG fight (𝑡𝑎 2⁄ ) is on average longer than the duration of a ST fight (𝑡𝑐 2⁄ ). So, an ST fight 495 
is less protracted and has a lower time cost but results in a lower payoff in terms of the 496 
portion of the food item gained on average by the attacker. This makes ST a less risky and 497 
less time costly strategy but one with a lower payoff than AGG when both strategies are 498 
successful.  499 
The behavioural strategies being used by the population as a whole need to be 500 
considered when trying to identify when it is advantageous for a searcher to use 501 
kleptoparasitism or for a handler to defend/ resist against kleptoparasitic attacks. In the 502 
population being modelled the various population dynamics that are possible result in twelve 503 
situations that need to be considered to identify advantageous conditions for searchers to 504 
attack and handlers to defend/ resist.  505 
Searchers: 506 
Following Broom & Ruxton (1998) and Broom et al. (2004), to assess when it is 507 
advantageous for a searcher to attack a handler it is sufficient to consider the instantaneous 508 
rate at which a searcher becomes a handler after encountering a handler. When a searcher 509 
encounters a handler it must decide whether to ignore the handler and continue searching for 510 
food items or attack the handler using either AGG or ST. The strategy it should use is the one 511 
that minimises the amount of time until it becomes the handler of a food item. This is the 512 
strategy that maximises the forager’s rate of gain per time foraging. If it ignores the handler 513 
then it is just a searcher and has a rate of gain of 𝑣𝑓𝑓; if it attacks it has a rate of gain that is 514 
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influenced by the time costs of the fight and, if it loses, the rate at which it finds other food 515 
items or handlers to challenge. The rates at which other food items or handlers are found and 516 
challenged by foragers are given by the foraging pathways 𝑇𝑠 for AGG attackers (Figure 3) 517 
and 𝑇𝑠
∗
 for ST attackers (Figure 4). In this model the following situations need to be 518 
considered when a searcher encounters a handler: 519 
When it is advantageous to attack, when the population resists/defends against attacks.  520 
1. When to use AGG (handler defends & population defends). 521 
2. When to use ST (handler resists & population resists).  522 
When it is advantageous not to attack the handler: 523 
3. When to ignore the handler and continue searching for food (population defends/ 524 
resists). 525 
When to attack if the population does not resist/defend against attacks.  526 
4. Searcher should always attack and the kleptoparasitic strategy used does not matter as 527 
both AGG and ST have the same payoff when the population surrenders. Both 528 
strategies obtain 1 whole food item.  529 
 
 
Handlers: 530 
When a handler is discovered by a searcher and attacked it can choose either to resist/defend 531 
the food item it is handling or surrender the item and resume searching for a new food item. 532 
The strategy it should use is the one that minimises the amount of time until it resumes 533 
handling a food item. If it resists/ defends the food item the time to resume handling is 534 
influenced by the duration of the fight and if it loses, the rate at which it encounters other 535 
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food items or handlers to challenge, as stated above this search path is denoted by 𝑇𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑠
∗
 536 
(Figures 3 and 4), which shows the time to acquire a food item from the start of searching. 537 
Likewise if it surrenders the food item it becomes a searcher again and resumes handling at 538 
the rate at which it finds a new food item or encounters another handler and successfully 539 
challenges them, again 𝑇𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑠
∗
. The following situations need to be considered when a 540 
handler is discovered by a searcher: 541 
When it is advantageous for a handler to resist/defend in a population where searchers attack 542 
and the rest of the handling population resists/defends: 543 
5. When to defend against AGG (population defends and handler’s searching strategy is 544 
AGG).  545 
6. When to defend against AGG (population defends and handler’s searching strategy is 546 
ST).  547 
7. When to resist against ST (population resists and handler’s searching strategy is ST). 548 
8. When to resist against ST (population resists and handler’s searching strategy is 549 
AGG).   550 
When it is advantageous for a handler to resist/defend in a population where searchers attack 551 
and the rest of the handling population does not resist:  552 
9. When to defend against AGG (population surrenders).  553 
10. When to resist against ST (population surrenders). 554 
(In these two cases the handler’s searching pathways are identical as the payoff for 555 
both AGG and ST is equal when the population surrenders food items. 𝑇𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑠
∗
 556 
simplify to 1/(𝑣𝑓𝑓 + 𝑣ℎ𝐻). 557 
When it is advantageous for a handler to resist/defend in a population where searchers do not 558 
attack but the forager is attacked by a mutant challenger: 559 
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11. When to defend AGG against a mutant AGG challenger. 560 
12. When to resist ST against a mutant ST challenger.  561 
(In these two cases the handler’s searching pathways are identical as the population 562 
does not attack, so all individuals acquire food at the rate 𝑣𝑓𝑓. The simplification of 563 
𝑇𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑠
∗
 to this rate is given by   1/𝑣𝑓𝑓. 564 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 565 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 566 
 
Working through situations 1-12 in turn results in a series of inequality conditions for 567 
a forager’s behaviour to be advantageous against the background population strategies 568 
described. These conditions outlining when the use of kleptoparasitism by a searcher and 569 
defending/ resisting against kleptoparasitism by a handler are optimal strategies are 570 
summarised in Table 3 (column 4) and are labelled A1a – A10 (Table 3, column 5). 571 
Appendix C outlines the steps by which conditions A1a – A10 were derived.  572 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 573 
Stage 3: Candidate evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS’s):  574 
To fully specify the behaviour of foragers in the population we must consider what decisions 575 
they make at the three decision points described by the four probabilities shown in Table 2, 576 
that is, the probability with which they attack AGG (𝑝1) together with the probability with 577 
which they attack ST (𝑝2) (recall that this is a single decision point with 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 ≤ 1), the 578 
probability with which a forager defends against AGG (𝑝3) and the probability with which 579 
they defend against ST (𝑝4). Following Hadjichrysanthou and Broom (2012), if the 580 
population is at or near to an equilibrium and all members follow strategy profile 581 
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(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4) that population can be invaded by foragers that use a different foraging 582 
strategy which results in a higher food consumption rate, as this would translate into a higher 583 
fitness payoff for those foragers. To consider whether a mutant playing a slightly different 584 
strategy to the rest of the population can invade the population playing strategy profile 585 
(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4) it is sufficient to consider whether the mutant uses a different strategy at any 586 
one of the three decision points. A different strategy at any one decision point that gives a 587 
higher payoff will result in an overall higher payoff for the mutant and it is sufficient to 588 
consider differences in pure strategies at each of the three decision points. Hadjichrysanthou 589 
and Broom (2012) provided proofs for some generic parameters and conducted extensive 590 
numerical investigation of why there are no mixed-strategy ESS’s. Following those 591 
arguments, consideration of the use of only pure strategies in this model means that the 592 
searcher will either always use AGG, always use ST, or always ignore the opportunity to 593 
attack. The working assumption in the current model therefore is that there are twelve 594 
candidates for pure strategy ESS’s that need to be considered as outlined below. Here the four 595 
probabilities (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4) take the value 1 or 0, meaning the associated behaviour is always 596 
used (1) or never used (0), respectively.  597 
- Strategy (1,0,1,0) (AGG Defender): The forager always attacks AGG and always 598 
defends against AGG, but never uses or resists against ST.  599 
- Strategy (0,1,0,1) (ST Resistor): The forager always attacks ST and always resists ST 600 
attacks, but never uses or defends against AGG.  601 
- Strategy (1,0,0,1) (AGG Resistor): The forager always attacks AGG but only ever 602 
resists against ST attacks.  603 
- Strategy (1,0,0,0) (AGG Marauder): The forager always attacks AGG but never 604 
resists or defends against attack.  605 
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- Strategy (0,1,1,0) (ST Defender): The forager always attacks ST and only defends 606 
against AGG.  607 
- Strategy (0,1,0,0) (ST Marauder): The forager always attacks ST but never resists or 608 
defends against attacks.  609 
- Strategy (1,0,1,1) (AGG Hawk): The forager always attacks AGG and always defends 610 
and resists against both types of attack.  611 
- Strategy (0,1,1,1) (ST Hawk): The forager always attacks ST and always defends and 612 
resists against both types of attack.  613 
- Strategy (0,0,1,1) (Retaliator): The forager never attacks but it always defends and 614 
resists against both types of attack.  615 
- Strategy (0,0,0,0) (Dove): The forager always searches for its own food, it never 616 
attacks and never defends or resists.  617 
- Strategy (0,0,0,1) (ST Retaliator): The forager never attacks using either strategy and 618 
never defends against AGG but always resists against ST.  619 
- Strategy (0,0,1,0) (AGG Retaliator): The forager never attacks using either strategy, it 620 
always defends against AGG but never against ST attacks.   621 
The twelve possible strategies listed will be evolutionarily stable (ESS’s) when different 622 
combinations of the conditions A1a to A10 (Table 3) are met. The combinations of 623 
conditions that result in a strategy being an ESS are shown in Table 4. Where an asterisk is 624 
shown there are no conditions in which the strategy is evolutionarily stable and a population 625 
using that strategy can always be invaded by a mutant playing a different strategy.   626 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 627 
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Results 628 
Fieldwork results: 629 
Population size and composition: The population at Billingsgate had a mean daily size of 40 630 
(Range: 29, 53; standard deviation: ~8) gulls. Foraging patches consisted of a mean of 12 631 
gulls (Range: 9, 20; standard deviation: ~3). A comparison was made of whether the 632 
proportions of each species engaged in foraging differed from the proportion of each species 633 
in the population as a whole, using headcounts for the total population and headcounts at 634 
patches. This comparison showed a great deal of correspondence between the composition of 635 
the total population and the composition of foraging patches (Population Composition: GBB 636 
11%, HG 70%, BHG 19%; Foraging Patch Composition: GBB 12%, HG 72%, BHG: 16%), 637 
which provided some reassurance regarding the stability of the population. As the 638 
kleptoparasitic behaviours of interest occurred within foraging patches, the data obtained 639 
from patches were used for analyses.   640 
Kleptoparasitism: Kleptoparasitic interactions were recorded in 112/183 foraging patches at 641 
Billingsgate. This gives a ratio of 61% of patches where at least one kleptoparasitic attack 642 
occurred and 39% of patches where no kleptoparasitism was observed. A total of 577 643 
kleptoparasitic incidents were recorded at Billingsgate, 362 (63%) of these occurrences were 644 
AGG kleptoparasitism and 215 (37%) were instances of ST kleptoparasitism. The success 645 
rates for the use of these strategies were AGG: 286/362 = 79% and ST 152/215 = 71%.  646 
 Analysis of host responses to kleptoparasitism showed that on average the population 647 
defended 45% of the time and surrendered 55% of the time. By strategy the population 648 
defended against AGG for 73/209 (35%) attacks and resisted against ST on 72/112 (64%) of 649 
occasions.   650 
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Foraging: Foraging patch videos were analysed to assess how many times foragers sampled 651 
for food and how often they obtained food items. The total number of foragers at Billingsgate 652 
recorded over all foraging patches was 2327. Analyses showed that these foragers sampled 653 
but didn’t obtain food on 5605 occasions and sampled and acquired food items on 1641 654 
occasions. These behaviours mirror the foraging behaviours of interest outlined in this model 655 
(Figure 2) where individuals sampling are searchers and individuals acquiring a food item are 656 
handlers. Foraging behaviour at Billingsgate can be summarised as: searchers 5605 (~71%), 657 
handlers 1641 (~21%) and kleptoparasitism 577 (~8%).  658 
Analysis and treatment of Billingsgate foraging data (Obtaining values for the model): 659 
The data from Billingsgate provided values for a number of the model parameters and 660 
strategies. The probability of an attacker winning a fight was given by the mean success rate 661 
of each kleptoparasitic strategy in the population. This was 79% for AGG giving a 662 
probability of success (𝛼) of 0.79, and 71% for ST giving a success probability (𝛽) of 0.71. 663 
The rate at which food was discovered at Billingsgate was calculated as the total number of 664 
items discovered divided by the total number of foragers. This gave a mean rate at which 665 
food items were discovered (𝑣𝑓𝑓) as 0.71 items per forager per minute. The rate at which 666 
foragers searched for handlers (𝑣ℎ) was calculated as the rate at which foragers were 667 
discovered to challenge as a proportion of the rate at which food items were discovered, this 668 
returned a value of 0.83 per minute.   669 
To calculate the probability of a searcher using a kleptoparasitic strategy, either 670 
attacking AGG or ST upon discovering a handler, (𝑝1) and (𝑝2) respectively, it was 671 
necessary to find some way of accounting for the proportion of occasions that foragers 672 
ignored a handler and continued searching for food items, as there is no direct way of 673 
knowing whether a searcher had the opportunity to attack and did not it was necessary to 674 
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estimate ignored opportunities. This was done using the percentage of foraging patches where 675 
no kleptoparasitism occurred as a measure of ignored opportunities. Kleptoparasitism was 676 
possible in all foraging patches and the percentage of patches where no kleptoparasitism took 677 
place, 39% of patches, was viewed as a crude index of the rate at which foragers ignored 678 
opportunities to steal. The probability that a searcher attacked using either AGG or ST was 679 
then calculated by multiplying the percentage with which the particular kleptoparasitic 680 
strategy was used by the percentage of patches within which kleptoparasitism occurred 681 
(61%). This gave a probability of attacking AGG (𝑝1) of 0.38 and the probability of attacking 682 
ST (𝑝2) of 0.23. The probability that a handler defended (𝑝3) or resisted (𝑝4) was simply the 683 
proportion of attacks recorded at Billingsgate where the handler defended or resisted. 684 
Handlers at Billingsgate defended against AGG 35% of the time making 𝑝3 0.35 and resisted 685 
against ST 64% of the time making 𝑝4 0.64.  686 
 Values were unknown for three parameters that were approximated using exponential 687 
probability distributions: mean handling time (𝑡ℎ), mean ST fight duration (𝑡𝑐), and mean 688 
AGG fight duration (𝑡𝑎). Plausible values for these parameters were investigated numerically 689 
using the solutions for the density of each behavioural compartment in the population at 690 
equilibrium and the known parameter values and behavioural compartment densities from the 691 
foraging data for Billingsgate. Table 5 summarises the parameter values and probabilities for 692 
strategy use in the Billingsgate population that were inputted into the model to investigate 693 
equilibrium densities of behaviours.  694 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 695 
The densities of behaviours in the population were obtained from the real foraging 696 
data for Billingsgate. The mean patch size at Billingsgate was 12 birds per patch. The data 697 
showed that on average the densities of individuals in each behavioural category were: 71% 698 
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searchers (𝑆) (this equates to ~8.52 birds/patch), 21% handlers (𝐻) (~2.52 birds/patch) and 699 
8% were engaged in kleptoparasitic fights over food (~0.96 birds/patch). As previously stated 700 
63% of the observed fights at Billingsgate involved AGG and 37% were ST fights. This gives 701 
values of approximately 0.6 birds per patch engaged in AGG fights and 0.36 birds per patch 702 
engaged in ST fights. As fights involved exactly one kleptoparasite and host, the ~0.6 birds 703 
engaged in AGG fights is split 50:50 between aggressive attackers (𝐴) (~0.3 birds/patch) and 704 
defenders (𝐷) (~0.3 birds/patch) and the remaining ~0.36 birds engaged in ST is split 50:50 705 
between stealth attackers (𝐶) (~0.18 birds/patch) and resistors (𝑅) (~0.18 birds/patch).  706 
Testing for equilibrium densities: 707 
The parameter values listed in Table 5 were used to investigate whether the density of 708 
individuals that occurred in behavioural compartments at Billingsgate could be at an 709 
equilibrium. Numerical investigation showed that in order for the densities of individuals 710 
observed in the foraging population at Billingsgate (Table 6, column 3) to be at an 711 
equilibrium, using the known parameter values and strategy probabilities for that population, 712 
then the mean handling time for food items (𝑡ℎ), mean duration of ST fights (𝑡𝑐) and mean 713 
duration of AGG fights (𝑡𝑎) per minute would be: 𝑡ℎ = 0.42, 𝑡𝑐 = 0.14, 𝑡𝑎 = 0.26. Appendix 714 
D outlines detailed algebraic solutions that gave the parameter values for 𝑡ℎ, 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑎.   715 
Assuming a foraging population of 12 individuals at patches, the above values for 𝑡ℎ, 716 
𝑡𝑐, and 𝑡𝑎 along with the parameter values shown in Table 5, were inputted into equations 9, 717 
10, 11, 12, 13 and 17. The quadratic formula (17) giving the equilibrium number of handlers 718 
was solved first, followed by 9 giving the equilibrium number of searchers and then 10, 11, 719 
12 and 13 giving the equilibrium number of ST attackers, resistors, AGG attackers and 720 
defenders respectively. The solutions resulted in equilibrium densities close to the densities 721 
of individuals in each compartment observed in the Billingsgate population (Table 6).  722 
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INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 723 
The results in Table 6 for parameter values 𝑡ℎ = 0.42, 𝑡𝑐 = 0.14, 𝑡𝑎 = 0.26 not only 724 
gave equilibrium densities close to the densities observed in the Billingsgate foraging 725 
population but returned ratios of AGG to ST in line with the rates with which these strategies 726 
were used by foragers at Billingsgate. This indicated that the duration of an ST fight to an 727 
AGG fight, at the values of 𝑡ℎ, 𝑡𝑐 and  𝑡𝑎 identified through numerical investigation, 728 
accurately captured the ratio of these two strategies in the real foraging population, this being 729 
that the mean duration of an AGG fight was nearly twice that of an ST fight.  730 
Ecological conditions for ESS’s: 731 
An investigation of the regions of parameter space where each of the candidate ESS’s shown 732 
in Table 4 occur was conducted. Each ESS occurs when a system of inequalities made up by 733 
various combinations of conditions A1a to A10 are satisfied (Table 4). Varying the values of 734 
different ecological parameters contained in the inequalities had a direct influence on when 735 
those inequalities were satisfied. Although all of conditions A1a to A10 were strict 736 
inequalities, the boundary conditions where they are satisfied were obtained by setting the left 737 
and right-hand sides of the inequalities equal to each other.  738 
The values for parameters obtained from the Billingsgate data and the values for 𝑡ℎ, 739 
𝑡𝑐, and 𝑡𝑎, described in the above section, were used in this analysis. Two parameters were 740 
allowed to vary when investigating the ecological conditions in which the ESS’s occur. These 741 
were the rate at which foragers find food (𝑣𝑓𝑓) and the total number of individuals in 742 
foraging patches (P) (Table 7).  743 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 744 
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These varied parameters were plotted on a Cartesian plane to create a visual 745 
parameter space of ESS’s for different values of the two ecological conditions. None of the 746 
inequalities (A1a – A10) explicitly contain the parameter P. Values for P were obtained by 747 
substituting equation 17 for H in conditions A3 to A8. These were then solved for P using 748 
Wolfram Alpha mathematical software (Wolfram Alpha©, 2016). Conditions A1a, A1b, A1c, 749 
A2, A9 and A10 do not contain the variable H. These inequalities were solved using the 750 
known values from the data recorded at Billingsgate for the various parameters making up 751 
those inequalities, this gave a value of 𝑣𝑓𝑓 for all P values.  752 
Inputting the real data from Billingsgate into the inequality conditions revealed that 5 753 
of the remaining 7 candidate ESS’s shown in Table 4 were actually possible in the parameter 754 
space of the Billingsgate environment. These 5 strategies were AGG Resistor, AGG 755 
Marauder, ST Marauder, AGG Hawk and ST Hawk. It was found that there were no regions 756 
of the foraging parameter space at Billingsgate where all the inequality conditions for the 757 
other two ESS candidates (ST Defender and Retaliator) were met, indicating that, although 758 
they were possible as ESS’s, for the values of ecological parameters occurring at Billingsgate 759 
they were not ESS strategies. For the Retaliator strategy this may be explained by the fact 760 
that the probability of success for both AGG and ST, 𝛼 and 𝛽 respectively, were very high at 761 
Billingsgate (𝛼 = 0.79, 𝛽 = 0.71) making some sort of attacking strategy worthwhile.  762 
The inequality conditions that were set as equations and solved for P, described 763 
above, were plotted as boundary conditions in foraging parameter space using MATLAB 764 
(Mathworks©, version R2015b). The regions of parameter space occupied by the five ESS 765 
strategies for Billingsgate are shown in Figure 5.  766 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 767 
Comparing strategy use at Billingsgate with ecological conditions for ESS’s: 768 
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A total of 189 focal animal observations were completed, as far as could be ascertained these 769 
were conducted on 189 different birds (HG: 102; GBB: 57; BHG: 30). As these focal animal 770 
analyses were observations of wild foraging birds there was considerable variation in how 771 
long a bird could be observed before it was lost from view. The duration for which an 772 
individual was observed was recorded in seconds and varied from 3 seconds to 650 seconds 773 
(Range: 647). A Shapiro Wilk test of normality on the data for duration of focal animal 774 
observations showed that it was significantly non-normally distributed (W=0.76, p<0.001), so 775 
the median of 60 seconds was the measure of central tendency that probably best reflected the 776 
duration of the focal animal observations conducted.  777 
Successfully attributing a strategy to an individual forager required the observation of 778 
interactions by that forager as both a searcher and handler. For a strategy where the forager 779 
never engages in a type of behaviour, such as Retaliator where the searcher never attacks, a 780 
minimum observation period of 300 seconds was used. This was viewed as a sufficiently long 781 
period of time to allow the focal animal’s behaviour to be observed in multiple interactions. 782 
None of the individuals observed met this threshold for duration so strategies such as Dove or 783 
Retaliator were not attributed to any birds. As neither of these strategies are ESS’s in the 784 
ecological conditions at Billingsgate this was essentially a moot point but is reported here as 785 
it formed part of the method used for attributing strategies. From the 189 observations 786 
conducted it was possible to confidently attribute a strategy to 52 foragers. The strategies 787 
used by these 52 foragers were considered against the ecological conditions (rate of food 788 
discovery (𝑣𝑓𝑓) and population density (𝑃)) in the patches in which they were observed. This 789 
permitted the strategies of our 52 individual foragers to be plotted against ecological 790 
conditions in the parameter space described for Billingsgate in Figure 5.    791 
All of the five strategies that could possibly be ESS’s at Billingsgate were recorded 792 
from the focal animal observations. Of the 52 foragers attributed strategies it was found that 793 
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12 of those foragers were using strategies in the correct region of parameter space to make 794 
them ESS strategies and 40 foragers were using their strategies in non-ESS regions of 795 
parameter space; thus  ~23% of foragers were making optimal foraging decisions and 796 
individually using an ESS strategy. Figure 6 shows the ESS foraging strategies plotted in 797 
parameter space and Figure 7 shows the location of the foraging strategies used in non-ESS 798 
regions of parameter space.  799 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 800 
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 801 
 Considerable variation was seen between strategies in the rates with which they were 802 
used and the rates with which those strategies were correctly and incorrectly used. Of the 52 803 
foragers to whom strategies could be attributed, ST Hawk (SH) was the least used strategy 804 
being used on only 2 occasions. The most used strategy was AGG Marauder (AM). This 805 
strategy was used on 22 occasions. AGG Resistor (AR), ST Marauder (SM) and AGG Hawk 806 
(AH) were each observed 9, 10 and 9 times respectively. 807 
 The Marauder strategies (AGG Marauder and ST Marauder) were the strategies used 808 
least effectively by foragers, on all occasions these were observed being used in areas of 809 
parameter space where they were not an ESS strategy. In most of these cases (AM: 14; SM: 810 
10) these strategies occurred in the region of parameter space where AGG Hawk and ST 811 
Hawk were ESS’s, indicating that foragers using Marauder strategies were correctly attacking 812 
handlers using AGG or ST, but not defending their food items when attacked in a region of 813 
parameter space where food was scarce and defensive strategies were optimal. 814 
 AGG Resistor was used in an ESS region on one occasion and in a non-ESS region on 815 
8 occasions. All observations of AGG Resistor in a non-ESS region also occurred in the 816 
region where AGG Hawk and ST Hawk were the ESS’s. Foragers using this strategy 817 
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appeared to make the error of not defending against AGG attacks by other foragers, despite 818 
attacking AGG and resisting against ST. 819 
Hawk strategies were used most effectively by foragers. ST Hawk and AGG Hawk 820 
were used in the correct regions of parameter space in which they were ESS’s on all 821 
occasions (SH: 2; AH: 9), indicating that individuals using these strategies were making 822 
optimal foraging decisions given the environmental conditions in which they found 823 
themselves. Table 8 shows the frequencies with which strategies were used in ESS and non-824 
ESS regions of parameter space. 825 
Although not considered explicitly in the model the breakdown of strategy use by 826 
species showed that all 12 of the strategies used correctly were used by the larger gull 827 
species, HG and GBB. It was possible to attribute strategies to 24 GBB, 26 HG and only 2 828 
BHG. The results showed that 25% of GBB (6/24 individuals) were using an ESS, 23% of 829 
HG (6/26 individuals) were using an ESS, and neither of the smaller BHG used an ESS.  830 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 831 
 
 
Discussion 832 
This model was developed to try and capture the kleptoparasitic behaviours of a population of 833 
foraging gulls at Billingsgate Market and to investigate what the model could tell us about the 834 
optimality and stability of the behavioural decisions made by individuals in that population. 835 
This was pursued in two ways: 1. By considering the density of individuals engaged in each 836 
behaviour of interest in the population and investigating the possibility that these behaviours 837 
were at equilibrium densities. 2. Through assessing the optimality of the behavioural 838 
39 
 
decisions of individual foragers when compared against the ecological conditions in the 839 
patches in which they were foraging. Were foragers using ESS strategies?  840 
Equilibrium densities: The values of a number of the model parameters were known from the 841 
real foraging behaviour at Billingsgate. The values for handling time (𝑡ℎ), ST fight duration 842 
(𝑡𝑐) and AGG fight duration (𝑡𝑎) were unknown and were varied to investigate numerically at 843 
what values of these parameters the model produced equilibrium densities that matched the 844 
densities of behaviours observed at Billingsgate. The values arrived at were: 𝑡ℎ=0.42, 845 
𝑡𝑐=0.14, 𝑡𝑎=0.26 minutes. The important question to ask about these values is whether they 846 
are plausible values for the parameters they represent.  847 
 Considering first the fight duration variables 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑎. At the reported values the 848 
duration of an AGG fight (𝑡𝑎) was twice that of an ST fight (𝑡𝑐). This fits with our 849 
understanding of these two kleptoparasitic strategies. Stealth kleptoparasitism by definition is 850 
a sneaky strategy that involves less of an interaction between attacker and handler (Giraldeau 851 
& Caraco, 2000; Vollrath, 1984) and in many cases that interaction was over before the 852 
handler could respond effectively and escalate to a protracted fight. In contrast AGG as a 853 
strategy actually required the attacker to engage in a fight with the handler to try and take the 854 
food item by force. In light of this, the finding that the duration of an AGG fight was twice 855 
that of an ST fight was reasonable and the fact that the values that produced the equilibrium 856 
densities (𝑡𝑐=0.14, 𝑡𝑎=0.26) delivered the correct ratio of AGG (~65%) to ST (~35%) as 857 
observed in the Billingsgate population was reassuring.  858 
 When considering whether these values accurately represent the mean duration of 859 
fights within the Billingsgate population it was noted that fights at Billingsgate, even AGG 860 
fights, whilst variable, were on average short in duration. We estimated from field 861 
observations that ST fights had mean duration of approximately 5 seconds and AGG fights 862 
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had mean duration of just under 10 seconds. However, we did not rely on these estimates as 863 
they were obtained during fieldwork by glancing at a wristwatch and making a quick note for 864 
an opportunistic sample of incidents, essentially those in close proximity to the observer, 865 
when other recording tasks permitted.  866 
Later analysis of foraging videos proved no more effective at providing reliable 867 
estimates of fight duration. There was a large amount of aggression between individuals in 868 
this population and numerous fights, most of which were unrelated to kleptoparasitism. 869 
Fights relating to kleptoparasitic incidents frequently overlapped with and were lost in the 870 
melee of more general aggressive interactions in and around foraging patches. An example of 871 
this we termed “jockeying for position”, which was often seen in patches where a dominant 872 
individual, such as a large GBB, had taken control of a significant item of food. Rather than 873 
challenge the individual for the item a number of birds would fight amongst themselves, 874 
apparently seeking to stay close to the handler waiting for them to finish with and discard the 875 
item. Whilst it was often possible to identify kleptoparasitic attempts on the handler in these 876 
situations accurately keeping track of the individuals for the full duration of the 877 
kleptoparasitic fight in the surrounding melee proved difficult. For this reason we treated 878 
AGG and ST fight duration as unknown variables and followed the approach of investigating 879 
them numerically. When considered as proportions of a minute, the values arrived at through 880 
numerical investigation would make ST fights approximately 4 seconds (𝑡𝑐 2⁄ × 60 = 0.07 ×881 
60) and AGG fights approximately 8 seconds (𝑡𝑎 2⁄ × 60 = 0.13 × 60), both of which sit 882 
close to the level we estimated for the duration of these fights.  883 
Over the year of study no significant injuries were sustained by birds engaged in 884 
fights over food. Gulls often sustain injuries whilst fighting and fights can last for a 885 
considerable length of time particularly during the breeding season when they are generally 886 
more aggressive (Tinbergen, 1953; personal obs.). The fact that no observations of injuries 887 
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were made over the period of study at Billingsgate may reflect that, on the whole, there is no 888 
shortage of food at the site so the conditions that would make staying in a lengthy fight a 889 
good economic decision might not have existed. This interpretation would agree with the 890 
short fight durations produced by the model for both strategies.    891 
The value arrived at for mean handling time, 𝑡ℎ=0.42, is considerably longer than the 892 
mean fight durations. This fits with what is known about food resources in the Billingsgate 893 
environment, which contained an abundance of larger food items most of which required 894 
some handling time before they could be consumed. This longer handling time relative to 895 
fight duration also presents the necessary window of opportunity required for a forager to 896 
identify and challenge handlers before they finished handling and consumed food items. We 897 
did not attempt to obtain a comprehensive estimate of the handling time of food items from 898 
the data. There were very many handling episodes, and estimation could be seriously biased 899 
by two key factors. Firstly, the handling time for food items in general includes the time spent 900 
before and after contests for that item; concentrating only on non-contested items would bias 901 
the results. Similarly there was a great deal of variation in the size of food items available at 902 
Billingsgate and thereby the amount of time we might expect these items to be handled. 903 
Using field observations it would be easy to bias an estimate of handling time as long bouts 904 
of handling are more likely to be noticed and smaller handling bouts easily missed. An 905 
analysis of a sample of the data showed a mean handling time of somewhat over 30 seconds. 906 
The value for mean handling time arrived at through numerical investigation, when 907 
considered as a proportion of a minute gives a value of about 25 seconds (0.42 × 60). This 908 
value is a little lower than our crude estimate but not unrealistically so, suggesting the value 909 
𝑡ℎ = 0.42 is plausible and may accurately reflect the mean times for which birds handled 910 
food items.   911 
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 Using the values for 𝑡ℎ, 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑎 to accurately draw conclusions about whether the 912 
densities of behavioural compartments at Billingsgate were at an equilibrium depends on 913 
whether the system of dynamical equations, set out in the model (equations 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 914 
7), included and captured all variables that influenced behaviour in that environment. As 915 
stated in the introduction, the lack of competitor species and other trophic levels at 916 
Billingsgate made it a good natural laboratory in which to try and meet the simplifying 917 
assumptions needed for a mathematical model. None of the values arrived at by numerical 918 
investigation were at unrealistic levels and the differences between 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑎 accurately 919 
captured the ratio of AGG to ST use at Billingsgate, meaning the model may provide a good 920 
approximation of the densities of behaviours seen in the real foraging population.  921 
 The fact that there has been a foraging population at this site since the early 1980’s 922 
and over that time the population, and the availability and scheduling of food, is likely to 923 
have remained relatively stable makes it a realistic possibility that the population may have 924 
settled at some equilibrium of searchers to handlers to individuals involved in kleptoparasitic 925 
interactions. The model developed and tested here has improved our understanding of and 926 
accurately described the density of behaviours in the Billingsgate foraging population.  927 
Use of ESS strategies: The focal animal analyses conducted to assess individual use of ESS’s 928 
showed that all five of the ESS’s that were possible at Billingsgate were actually observed in 929 
the foraging population. The fact that these were exactly the five strategies we observed is 930 
notable given that there are potentially 12 different strategies (Table 4) available to a 931 
population that can utilise the kleptoparasitic behaviours we modelled here. The presence of 932 
multiple strategies in the population adds a further strand of support to research showing that 933 
kleptoparasitism in gull species is a flexible foraging strategy and a facultative response to 934 
changing environmental conditions (Maniscalco & Ostrand, 1997; Spencer et al. 2017).  935 
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Further, these five strategies involved two of the types of kleptoparasitism described 936 
by Giraldeau & Caraco (2000) (Stealth and Aggressive). Our data has demonstrated the use 937 
of more than one of these kleptoparasitism types within species in the Billingsgate 938 
population. Although other research has established the existence of these different types of 939 
kleptoparasitism through their individual use by a species (e.g. Aggressive: Bald Eagles 940 
Haliaeetus leucocephalus (Hansen, 1986); Stealth: Eastern chipmunks Tamias striatus 941 
(Elliott, 1978)) no work has given particular focus to the presence of more than one of these 942 
kleptoparasitism types in a single population. We hope that the way we have recorded and 943 
analysed these behaviours has added some value to the literature for those interested in 944 
investigating how the ability to use multiple types of kleptoparasitism influences behavioural 945 
dynamics.    946 
When distinguishing which of the five possible ESS strategies to use in different 947 
environmental conditions, we found that 23% of the foragers to whom strategies could be 948 
attributed were actually playing an ESS. This seems to indicate that gulls at Billingsgate were 949 
on the whole not making good behavioural decisions. There are, however, a number of 950 
possible explanations for this result.  951 
 First, time was used to model all the costs of the different foraging activities in this 952 
population. The model assumed we can ignore the potential energetic and injury costs of 953 
different kleptoparasitic strategies. The results showed that gulls were using Marauder 954 
strategies more than predicted by the model and thereby fighting less than they should have 955 
to match ESS predictions. This suggests that there may be additional costs to fighting beyond 956 
the time costs that were the focus of our model. If we had added an extra penalty to the 957 
model, to represent risk of injury or use of energy, making fighting more costly, this would 958 
have moved the regions of parameter space occupied by different strategies and we may have 959 
44 
 
found that more individuals were using ESS strategies in the appropriate environmental 960 
conditions.  961 
Second, as Billingsgate provides a stable and consistent food source, it is possible that 962 
individuals in the population have learned the scheduling and have a good knowledge of 963 
quantities and regularity of food resources at the site. For example, the gulls may have 964 
learned to pay attention to certain cues associated with routines at the site. It was noted that 965 
all the bins are gathered together and washed out at the same time each day and this 966 
frequently generated food patches. In such a case we may conclude that what appeared to be 967 
non-optimal behaviours, of using Marauder strategies in patches where there were few 968 
resources and the model predicted defending food items, may actually reflect knowledge 969 
amongst members of the population of the frequency with which patches appear and an 970 
expectation that resources will not be scarce for long. Indeed, the mean number of patches 971 
per day of fieldwork at Billingsgate was 5.54, indicating that within the hours available to 972 
forage at the market the possibility of further patches appearing was often likely. A logical 973 
conclusion that could be drawn from this line of argument is that behaviour may change over 974 
the course of the day as the daily foraging window of opportunity at this site draws to a close 975 
and further patches become less and less likely. This would match previous findings in the 976 
risk-sensitive foraging literature which have shown that foragers will take greater risks as the 977 
time available to meet their daily energy needs runs out (Caraco et al., 1980). This may result 978 
in riskier aggressive and defensive strategies being more likely later in the day at 979 
Billingsgate. This is not something that was assessed in our model but suggests a potentially 980 
fruitful area for further research. Anecdotally it was noted that the population spends more 981 
time loafing as the morning progresses suggesting there are sufficient resources at the site for 982 
the majority of birds to become satiated, however, this may change seasonally as the energy 983 
demands of these gulls change.      984 
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 Third, the one-species approach used to model this population assumed that all 985 
foragers were essentially identical and that averaging the data for the whole year of study 986 
would successfully smooth out the influence of competitive asymmetries between individuals 987 
and between the three study species. The one-species approach was used to keep the model as 988 
simple as possible and make the necessary mathematics more tractable. The regions of 989 
parameter space predicted by the model make intuitive sense and agree with previous models 990 
(Broom et al. 2004; Hadjichrysanthou & Broom, 2012), with ESS regions for Hawk strategies 991 
in low food availability patches and Marauder strategies in areas of higher food availability 992 
where defensive behaviour is less necessary as new food items are encountered frequently. 993 
The model did not fully predict individual foraging decisions. This may be because additional 994 
factors such as injury and energetic costs, not included in the model, may have influenced 995 
strategy choice. However, gull species differ considerably in morphology and potentially 996 
thereby in competitive ability. Despite being frequently found together in mixed-species 997 
foraging flocks, the three species found at Billingsgate differ considerably in size and 998 
dominance. GBB and HG are amongst the largest of gull species, being both predatory and 999 
aggressive with large powerful bills. The BHG in contrast is a much smaller species of gull. 1000 
Beyond the ecological parameters of food discovery rate (𝑣𝑓𝑓) and density of the population 1001 
in a patch (𝑃) that were the focus of this analysis, asymmetries between foragers of the 1002 
different species clearly did affect the foraging decisions made. For example, the more 1003 
aggressive Hawk strategies (AGG Hawk and ST Hawk) were the strategies used effectively 1004 
and played as ESS’s on all occasions. These are likely to be strategies used by the larger, 1005 
more dominant species. In contrast, the Marauder strategies (ST Marauder and AGG 1006 
Marauder) were strategies used in the non-ESS regions of parameter space. These strategies 1007 
were seen most frequently in the region where AGG Hawk and ST Hawk were ESS’s, 1008 
indicating that foragers were failing to defend food items when such behaviour would have 1009 
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been optimal. What appeared to be sub-optimal behaviour of surrendering food in a region 1010 
where food was scarce and defensive behaviours were predicted by the model, in most cases 1011 
will have been the best behavioural decision for some handlers, given the competitive 1012 
advantages of the bird that was attacking it. For example, due to differences in size and 1013 
strength it would never be optimal for a BHG handler to defend against a GBB or HG, indeed 1014 
the data from Billingsgate showed that BHG never defended when attacked by either of these 1015 
larger species. The asymmetries between these two species are based on size dimorphism and 1016 
are clear for all individuals to see. As argued by Maynard Smith (1982), when individuals are 1017 
aware of asymmetries those asymmetries will affect behaviour. The one-species model 1018 
developed here did not reflect the fact that the optimal behaviour in a given region of 1019 
parameter space would differ between the three study species due to differences in 1020 
competitive ability; and the modelling assumption of only considering pure strategies 1021 
overlooked the fact that the best decision a handler can make may change as a function of the 1022 
species of opponent.  1023 
Mixed strategies were not observed in the focal animal observations conducted. This 1024 
may be because an animal that has a best strategy should use that strategy. However, we 1025 
know from analysis of the patterns of kleptoparasitic behaviour in the data at Billingsgate that 1026 
larger species used AGG against smaller species, smaller species used ST against larger 1027 
species and that gulls used both AGG and ST against conspecifics (75% AGG, 25% ST). 1028 
This leaves a number of possible scenarios: Individuals specialise in one type of 1029 
kleptoparasitism and select their opponents based on this, so the population consists of a mix 1030 
of individuals using pure strategies. Alternatively, individuals use both types of 1031 
kleptoparasitism and will change which one they use based on the competitive ability of their 1032 
opponent. Although this second type was not observed in the focal observations it seems 1033 
likely that there will be individuals in the population that do switch strategies based on 1034 
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opponent. Perhaps none of the focal observations were of sufficiently long duration to 1035 
observe all the necessary interactions to show this. If it had been possible to mark/identify 1036 
individuals, this picture could have been developed by observing individuals across foraging 1037 
patches building up a more comprehensive picture of foraging strategies of individuals. 1038 
Examination of the focal animal data showed that all 12 individuals that correctly used ESS’s 1039 
were larger gull species, either GBB or HG, indicating that the parameter space shown in 1040 
Figure 5 may best capture the ESS regions for more dominant individuals in the population.  1041 
 Despite the above argument, closer examination of the focal animal data showed that 1042 
between GBB and HG these larger species did not differ significantly in their successful use 1043 
of ESS’s, with 25% of GBB and 23% of HG using the correct strategy. The GBB is larger 1044 
and more dominant than the HG, if the regions of parameter space better suit dominant 1045 
individuals we might expect the majority of birds using ESS’s to be GBB, however, this was 1046 
not the case. Individuals of both species ineffectively used Marauder strategies at a high rate 1047 
with 46% of GBB and 73% of HG not defending food items in environmental conditions 1048 
where they should have. The GBB did show a slightly greater tendency to engage in some 1049 
sort of defensive behaviour, with 33% of individuals using the Aggressive Resistor (AR) 1050 
strategy compared to only 4% of HG using this strategy, but the majority of this use (88%) 1051 
was in the wrong region of parameter space. The much smaller BHG used only Marauder 1052 
strategies which fits the argument that competitive differences influenced behaviour, but as it 1053 
was only possible to attribute a strategy to 2 foraging BHG, with so few data points, this adds 1054 
little evidence to support the idea that the parameter space generated by the model depicts 1055 
strategies for dominant individuals.  1056 
 When assessing the amount of error in the model’s ability to predict individual 1057 
behaviour the picture appears to be more complicated than species level differences in 1058 
competitive ability can account for. However, there is a further dimension upon which 1059 
48 
 
foragers in this population can differ in competitive ability and that is age-class. Within 1060 
species the foraging abilities of gulls increase with age up to maturity (Verbeek, 1977a; 1061 
Bertellotti & Yorio, 2000). We can expect this dimension to influence behaviour with 1062 
juvenile gulls perhaps investing more in certain types of kleptoparasitic strategies due to their 1063 
lesser competitive abilities or poorer foraging decisions due to inexperience. Juvenile gulls 1064 
made up 48% of the foraging population at Billingsgate, however, juveniles were 1065 
overrepresented in the group of 52 gulls to whom a foraging strategy could be attributed, 1066 
which consisted of 69% juvenile birds. This heavy bias towards juveniles in the population of 1067 
individuals used to assess individual foraging decisions highlights further that the division of 1068 
parameter space regions for Billingsgate may be complex and that the sample of gulls to 1069 
whom a strategy could be attributed to test the model may not generalise to the population as 1070 
a whole.   1071 
 The results indicate that due to competitive differences the regions of ESS parameter 1072 
space will differ between species and possibly by age-class. Rather than foragers at 1073 
Billingsgate making poor foraging decisions it is actually the case that the optimal 1074 
behavioural decision will differ by species and age-class throughout the parameter space and 1075 
as a function of opponent. A more complex model incorporating these factors is required to 1076 
investigate the optimality of individual foraging decisions in the population at Billingsgate.  1077 
 Further, discussion is also required of a more fundamental limitation of the approach 1078 
taken in this research. Values for model parameters were extracted from field data. Using this 1079 
approach it was necessary to find some meaningful way of aggregating field data that 1080 
captured behaviour in the Billingsgate population. This was achieved by working out 1081 
probabilities for certain behaviours based on data for the whole population over the year of 1082 
study. This gave single probabilities for behaviours such as winning fights and attempting 1083 
kleptoparasitic attacks that remained constant. Just as calculating the average for any rate is 1084 
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of limited value in identifying the instantaneous rate at any single point over the period of 1085 
measurement, the method for calculating probabilities for certain behaviours at Billingsgate 1086 
ignored the fact that these probabilities may change with environmental conditions over time. 1087 
The alternative approach would have required generating a model for each of the 183 patches 1088 
recorded. This would have resulted in excessive model fitting when trying to capture 1089 
something general about kleptoparasitism in this population. This limitation is of most 1090 
relevance when considering the behaviours of individual foragers. The parameter estimates 1091 
that generated the regions of parameter space for different ESS’s (Figure 5) will not have 1092 
been appropriate for all foragers; this was certainly true at the level of species and age-class, 1093 
and at the finest level of granularity each forager may have had its own unique parameter 1094 
space division for ESS’s. However, all methods of sampling and data collation result in some 1095 
loss of precision, so, despite these limitations, the approach taken was viewed as a valid way 1096 
to summarise kleptoparasitic behaviours and arrive at parameter estimates for this population 1097 
at the most general level.    1098 
 The application of theoretical models to the behaviour of wild foraging populations is 1099 
a neglected area of research. Empirical work in this area has frequently focused on using 1100 
captive populations of foragers to test the frequency-dependent payoffs predicted by P-S 1101 
models, often using aviary populations of seed-feeding passerines (Giraldeau et al., 1994; 1102 
Mottley & Giraldeau, 2000). Studies using natural populations are rare (Beauchamp, 2014). 1103 
Hansen (1986) settled for a qualitative assessment of the extent to which kleptoparasitic and 1104 
producing strategies matched game-theoretic equilibrium predictions when studying foraging 1105 
interactions between Bald eagles. Work by Beauchamp (2014) went further by assessing 1106 
whether producing and scrounging tactics provided the same mean payoffs in foraging 1107 
aggregations of Semipalmated sandpipers (Calidris pusilla). Behavioural cues of time spent 1108 
exploiting a patch in the Beauchamp (2014) study were used to measure intake, this was used 1109 
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to calculate payoffs and assess the fitness of different strategies through comparison of time 1110 
spent exploiting produced versus scrounged patches. A comparable approach in our model 1111 
would have been to try to use handling time to calculate payoffs for different strategies 1112 
relative to different sized food items that were stolen. However, in the Billingsgate 1113 
population, birds competed for discrete hard to divide food items where contest times were 1114 
integral to foraging efficiency. As a result the differential equation based method we used, 1115 
whereby minimisation of time costs in acquiring food items was used to compare the fitness 1116 
of behaviours was, we believe, the most practical approach at Billingsgate.  1117 
 Beauchamp (2014) found that scrounging increased when individuals had difficulty 1118 
finding patches and may function to reduce the variance in payoffs they experience. This 1119 
would be an appropriate conclusion for that study system, as sandpipers were exploiting 1120 
highly divisible patches containing numerous minute prey items and kleptoparasitism is 1121 
assumed to be a risk-averse strategy. Our population and model differed from this in that 1122 
there was a finite quantity of only partially divisible food items and gulls had no problem 1123 
locating these food items but all food items were likely to be quickly taken possession of by 1124 
other gulls. The decision to engage in kleptoparasitic behaviour then became a potentially 1125 
risky strategy often involving the cost of having to fight for the item.  1126 
 Research by Morand-Ferron et al., (2007) investigated kleptoparasitism in a wild 1127 
population of Carib grackles (Quiscalus lugubris) by using provisioning studies. Each item of 1128 
food was indivisible and required some handling before it could be exploited and Carib 1129 
grackles used aggressive and stealth kleptoparasitism to obtain these food items. They found 1130 
that scrounging was negatively frequency dependent in line with P-S model predictions, but 1131 
were unable to provide insight into how the use of different types of kleptoparasitism shaped 1132 
patterns of behaviour in their study population. This may be because, with only one study 1133 
species, there was no easy way to discern differences in competitive ability between foragers, 1134 
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so identifying the relationship between how differences in competitive ability influenced the 1135 
use of different types of kleptoparasitism may not have been possible. Our model, by 1136 
considering a population of one species, suffered a similar limitation and further work to 1137 
investigate the dynamics of strategy use and competitive ability, as discussed above, seems 1138 
worthwhile. Mixed-species flocks of gulls provide a good study system for addressing these 1139 
questions as they can use all three of the kleptoparasitism strategies described and differences 1140 
in competitive ability can also be readily identified through size differences between species 1141 
and age differences within species, recognised through plumage.  1142 
 A key aim of our model was to investigate the extent to which it is possible to 1143 
adequately specify the parameters of real populations of foragers and assess the optimality of 1144 
behaviour within those populations. This was achieved through an analysis of the equilibrium 1145 
density of kleptoparasitic behaviours as well as the optimality of individual foraging 1146 
decisions. The results suggest that in populations that can be demarcated, such as the one at 1147 
Billingsgate, applying evolutionary game theory models to study behaviour could be an 1148 
effective research tool. The model reported here proved effective at investigating the 1149 
equilibrium density of different behavioural compartments in the population and in 1150 
identifying the ESS strategies expected to be present in the population. Increasing the 1151 
complexity of this model should further increase its utility for investigating the optimality of 1152 
individual foraging behaviour, so the prospects for applying this modelling approach to real 1153 
foraging populations seem good.  1154 
 This research focused on modelling the behavioural decisions of a population of urban 1155 
gulls. Gull populations in the UK have declined significantly over the last century resulting in 1156 
a number of species being listed as conservation priorities (Eaton et al., 2015). 1157 
Simultaneously gull populations have been growing in urban areas (Rock, 2005) by 1158 
exploiting an abundance of food resources from anthropogenic waste as well as secure nest 1159 
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sites on buildings. This has generated considerable research interest regarding the 1160 
conservation and changing ecology of these species (Scott et al., 2014; Rock & Vaughan, 1161 
2013; Spencer et al., 2017; Ross-Smith et al., 2014). We hope that the research reported here 1162 
will convince researchers of the utility of evolutionary game theory as a tool for investigating 1163 
how good the behavioural decisions of urban gulls are. Knowledge of the optimality of their 1164 
behaviour and foraging abilities will be essential to their conservation and will be important 1165 
in predicting the likely population trajectory of these species.    1166 
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Figure Legends 
 
 
Figure 1. Trader’s Car Park, Billingsgate Market. Boundaries of study area are outlined in 
black. Distances are shown in metres. Image taken from Google maps 24/11/15.   
 
Figure 2. Flow diagram showing the dynamics of the Billingsgate foraging population 
for the single-species model. The arrows show the inflows and outflows of the different 
behavioural compartments and the rates at which these occur are shown along the arrows. 
Rates are given by combinations of the model notation (Table 2). Dashed arrows show the 
rates at which challenged handlers surrender food items without a fight and thereby change 
compartments with searchers.  
 
Figure 3. Searching pathway for an AGG forager. 𝑇𝑠 is the time required, from the start of 
searching, to either find a food item or successfully steal from another handler using AGG. 
Zero (0) indicates the searcher successfully acquires food and exits the searching pathway.  
 
Figure 4. Searching pathway for an ST forager. 𝑇𝑠
∗
 is the time required from the start of 
searching to either find a new food item or successfully steal from another handler using ST. 
Zero (0) indicates the searcher successfully finds food and exits the searching pathway. When 
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successful in using ST the forager still has only acquired a portion 𝑥 of a food item and still 
has a search time of (1 − 𝑥)𝑇𝑠
∗ before it obtains food to the value of a whole food item.   
 
Figure 5. Regions of the foraging parameter space at Billingsgate where each of the 5 
possible ESS’s occurs for different population density values (P) and food discovery 
rates (𝒗𝒇𝒇). The five possible ESS’s represented are AGG Hawk (AH), ST Hawk (SH), 
AGG Resistor (AR), AGG Marauder (AM) and ST Marauder (SM). Lines represent the 
boundaries of parameter space regions where different strategies are ESS’s. Labels for the 
strategies are shown in their ESS region. Note that it is possible for more than one strategy to 
be an ESS in the same region of parameter space and ESS regions for different strategies 
overlap in some cases.  
 
Figure 6. Foraging strategies used in the region of parameter space in which they are 
ESS’s. Each symbol plotted represents one of the 12 foragers making the optimal foraging 
decision. Foragers are depicted by symbols based on the strategy used: AR (O), AH (X), SH 
(#). Lines and labels on the figure show the boundaries for regions where different strategies 
are ESS’s.  
 
Figure 7. Foraging strategies used in the region of parameter space in which they are 
not an ESS. Each symbol represents a forager that is using a strategy other than the ESS 
strategy for that region of parameter space (N=40). Foragers are depicted by symbols based 
on the strategy used: AR (X), AM (O), SM (#).Lines and labels on the figure show the 
boundaries for regions where different strategies are ESS’s.      
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Tables & Table Legends 
 
Table 1. Behaviours constituting strategies of aggressive and stealth kleptoparasitism  
Strategy  Behaviour 
Aggressive Force Kleptoparasite uses of bill to make contact with host’s 
body in order to effect theft. 
Attempt to physically pull or tear food item from host. 
Threat Upright threat posture – Bird stands upright with head 
tilted forward, and holds wings out from body so they 
are clearly defined and no longer partly-concealed by 
the contour feathers of mantle and body (Tinbergen, 
1953).   
Wings spread – Kleptoparasite charges the host with 
wings spread. 
Charge – (BHG only) Kleptoparasite drops its head 
forward, flattens out its body and then charges at the 
host. 
Stealth  Food stolen from the floor in front of the host.  
  Food stolen whilst the host is distracted and not in 
contact with the food item.  
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Table 2. Model notation.  
Population Densities Definition 
𝑃 Density of the total foraging population 
𝑆 Density of searchers 
𝐻 Density of handlers 
𝐴 Density of aggressive kleptoparasites 
𝐷 Density of defenders against aggressive kleptoparasitism 
𝐶 Density of stealth kleptoparasites 
𝑅 Density of resistors against stealth kleptoparasitism 
Model Parameters  
𝑣𝑓𝑓 Rate at which foragers find food items  
𝑣ℎ𝐻 Rate at which searchers encounter handlers  
𝑡ℎ Expected time needed for a handler to consume a food 
item  
𝑡𝑎 2⁄  Expected duration of an aggressive fight 
𝑡𝑐 2⁄  Expected duration of a stealth fight 
𝛼 Probability that the attacker wins an aggressive fight 
𝛽 Probability that the attacker wins a stealth fight 
𝑥 Avg. proportion of a food item obtained using strategy 𝑝2 
Strategies  
𝑝1 Probability that a searcher attacks using aggressive 
kleptoparasitism upon encountering a handler 
𝑝2 Probability that a searcher attacks using stealth 
kleptoparasitism upon encountering a handler 
𝑝3 Probability that a handler attacked using aggressive 
kleptoparasitism defends its food item 
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𝑝4 Probability that a handler attacked using stealth 
kleptoparasitism resists the attack for its food item 
 
 
 
Table 3. Conditions under which it is advantageous to challenge and resist/ defend in 
the model of the Billingsgate population.  
Situation Situation 
Description 
Decision Solution Inequality 
  Searcher   
1 Handler 
defends & 
pop’n defends 
When to use 
AGG? 
2𝛼
𝑡𝑎
> max (
2𝛽𝑥
𝑡𝑐
, 𝑣𝑓𝑓) 
A1a 
2 Handler resists 
& pop’n resists 
When to use 
ST? 
2𝛽𝑥
𝑡𝑐
> max(
2𝛼
𝑡𝑎
, 𝑣𝑓𝑓) A1b 
3 Handler & 
pop’n resists/ 
defends 
When to ignore 
handler 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 > max (
2𝛼
𝑡𝑎
,
2𝛽𝑥
𝑡𝑐
) 
A1c 
4 Handler 
surrenders & 
pop’n 
surrenders 
When to use 
AGG or ST? 
∞ > 𝑣𝑓𝑓 A2 
  Handler   
5 Pop’n defends 
& handler is an 
AGG forager 
When to 
defend against 
AGG? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛼)
𝑡𝑎
+ (1
− 2𝛼)𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A3 
6 Pop’n defends 
& handler is an 
ST forager 
When to 
defend against 
AGG? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝑣ℎ𝑡𝑐𝐻)
𝑡𝑎
− 𝛽𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A4 
7 Pop’n resists & 
handler is an 
ST forager 
When to resist 
against ST? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛽𝑥)
𝑡𝑐
+ (1 − 𝛽
− 𝛽𝑥)𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A5 
8 Pop’n resists & 
handler is an 
AGG forager 
When to resist 
against ST?  
𝑣𝑓𝑓
<
(1 − 𝛽𝑥)(2 + 𝑣ℎ𝑡𝑎𝐻)
𝑡𝑐
− 𝛼𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A6 
9 Pop’n 
surrenders 
When to 
defend against 
AGG? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛼)
𝑡𝑎
− 𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A7 
10 Pop’n 
surrenders 
When to resist 
against ST? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛽𝑥)
𝑡𝑐
− 𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A8 
11 Pop’n doesn’t 
attack & 
mutant AGG 
attacker 
When to 
defend against 
AGG? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛼)
𝑡𝑎
 
A9 
63 
 
12 Pop’n doesn’t 
attack & 
mutant ST 
attacker 
When to resist 
against ST?  
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛽𝑥)
𝑡𝑐
 
A10 
 
 
Table 4. Conditions that need to be satisfied for each of the twelve candidate foraging 
strategies to be an ESS.  
Strategy  Strategy Name  ESS Conditions† 
(1,0,1,0) AGG Defender ∗ 
(0,1,0,1) ST Resistor ∗ 
(1,0,0,1) AGG Resistor 𝐴2 ∩ 𝐴8 ∩ 𝐴7𝑐 
(1,0,0,0) AGG Marauder 𝐴2 ∩ 𝐴8𝑐 ∩ 𝐴7𝑐 
(0,1,1,0) ST Defender 𝐴2 ∩ 𝐴7 ∩ 𝐴8𝑐 
(0,1,0,0) ST Marauder 𝐴2 ∩ 𝐴7𝑐 ∩ 𝐴8𝑐 
(1,0,1,1) AGG Hawk 𝐴1𝑎 ∩ 𝐴3 ∩ 𝐴6 
(0,1,1,1) ST Hawk 𝐴1𝑏 ∩ 𝐴4 ∩ 𝐴5 
(0,0,1,1) Retaliator 𝐴1𝑐 ∩ 𝐴9 ∩ 𝐴10 
(0,0,0,0) Dove ∗ 
(0,0,0,1) ST Retaliator ∗ 
(0,0,1,0) AGG Retaliator ∗ 
 † – Systems of inequalities (A1a to A10, Table 3) that need to be satisfied for a strategy to be 
an ESS. Conditions with a superscript means the complement of that particular condition 
needs to be satisfied as part of the ESS combination. An asterisk indicates there are no 
conditions in which the strategy is an ESS. 
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Table 5. Mean values for model parameters obtained from Billingsgate foraging data.  
Parameter/ 
Strategy 
Meaning of Parameter Value 
𝜶 Probability of winning AGG fight 0.79 
𝜷 Probability of winning ST fight 0.71 
𝒑𝟏 Probability of using aggressive 
(AGG) kleptoparasitism 
0.38 
𝒑𝟐 Probability of using stealth (ST) 
kleptoparasitism 
0.23 
𝒑𝟑 Probability of defending 0.35 
𝒑𝟒 Probability of resisting 0.64 
𝒗𝒇𝒇 Rate at which an individual discovers 
food items 
0.71 
𝒗𝒉 Rate at which a forager discovers 
handlers 
0.83 
𝒕𝒉 Mean handling time for a food item 0.42 
𝒕𝒄 Twice the duration of a stealth (ST) 
fight 
0.14 
𝒕𝒂 Twice the duration of an aggressive 
(AGG) fight 
0.26 
𝒙 Avg. portion of item obtained by ST 0.63 
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Table 6. Equilibrium density results for the Billingsgate population at parameter values 
of 𝒕𝒉 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟐, 𝒕𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒, 𝒕𝒂 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟔.  
Behavioural 
Compartment 
Equilibrium Density* Billingsgate Density† 
Handlers (𝑯) ≈2.53 2.52 
Searchers (𝑺) ≈8.5 8.52 
ST attackers (𝑪) ≈0.18 0.18 
Resistors (𝑹) ≈0.18 0.18 
AGG attackers (𝑨) ≈0.31 0.30 
Defenders (𝑫) ≈0.31 0.30 
 *Column 2 shows the density of each compartment at equilibrium for these parameter 
values. †Column 3 shows the density of each compartment actually observed at Billingsgate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Values used to investigate the regions of parameter space occupied by different 
ESS’s at Billingsgate.  
Parameter/ 
Strategy 
Meaning of Parameter Value 
𝜶 Probability of winning AGG fight 0.79 
𝜷 Probability of winning ST fight 0.71 
𝒗𝒇𝒇 Rate at which an individual discovers 
food items 
Varied 
𝒗𝒉 Rate at which a forager discovers 
handlers 
0.83 
𝒕𝒉 Mean handling time for a food item 0.42 
𝒕𝒄 Twice the duration of a stealth (ST) 
fight 
0.14 
𝒕𝒂 Twice the duration of an aggressive 
(AGG) fight 
0.26 
𝑷 Population Density Varied 
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Table 8. Frequency with which strategies at Billingsgate were used in the region of 
parameter space where they were an ESS and regions where they were not an ESS.  
Strategy ESS region Non-ESS region 
AGG Resistor 1 8 
AGG Marauder 0 22 
ST Marauder 0 10 
AGG Hawk 9 0 
ST Hawk 2 0 
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